D
uring the summer of 1914, as Europe prepared for war, the United States Congress debated whether to adapt European models of agricultural fi nance to the Americas. Th e question was whether the federal government would intervene in the farm mortgage market. Modernizing agriculture was an important priority for farmers, businessmen, and government offi cials, and federal policymakers saw boosting farm production as a national imperative. At stake in these debates were signifi cant questions about the prerogatives of the nation-state: did the national government have the authority to assist in the expansion of mortgage credit to rural producers, who had long suff ered from limited access to long-term loans? Should the reforms to the banking system that had been passed through the 1913 Federal Reserve Act be extended into agriculture? How should rural communities adapt: through farm consolidation, large-scale mechanization, or a commitment to a diff use network of small-scale, low-technology farms? For decades, farmers had argued that they suff ered from limited local credit markets, and many argued that they were constrained from expanding their operations because of the dearth of lenders willing to invest in agricultural improvement. Aft er 1912 members of Congress embraced this cause, negotiating the terms of a radical new federal intervention in the rural economy.
Congress established a mechanism that proved crucial to the reorganization of American agriculture with the passage of the 1916 Federal Farm Loan Act. Th is legislation appropriated funds from the US Treasury to create a network of regional land banks extending government-seeded, long-term, low-interestrate mortgages on land and improvements. Th is program provided an infl ux of new credit for American farms, building upon the precedent of decades of subsidies to railroads, for millennia and injecting a new reservoir of capital into the region.
Most scholarly analyses of the impacts of World War I on the American home front have featured the expansion of federal control over transportation networks, food policy, and political dissent. Yet despite the considerable literature on wartime conditions, historians and economists oft en overlook one of the most pronounced and long-lasting eff ects of this transformation: the altered relationship between agricultural producers and the state. Vast increases in production reshaped the rural landscape, and reordered the relationship between the United States and its allies while creating surpluses of grain and cotton that would vex agricultural policymakers for decades. In brief, the larger geopolitical context of the Great War in Europe precipitated fundamental changes in the economic and agroenvironmental practices of American farmers.
3 Th ese new practices brought increased effi ciency and the maximization of resources, and most Americans embraced them as the benefi ts of a modernizing age, not anticipating the unintended economic and ecological consequences of these policies. 4 Th e interplay between farm fi nance and environmental change was of paramount importance in the transformation of American agriculture during this period. Some environmental historians have examined the environmental impacts of agriculture, and yet they too frequently ignore the economic mechanisms through which farms have expanded. 5 Similarly, while agricultural historians have devoted a great deal of attention to the cultivation of commodity crops and rural social dynamics, they have neglected the fi nancial networks that funded industrializing agriculture. 6 Economic historians have acknowledged the homesteading, agricultural research, and irrigation.
1 During the wartime emergency these farm loans allowed expansion-minded American farmers to invest in new machines, consolidate operations, and modernize their facilities in order to produce ever-higher yields deemed crucial to the war eff ort. Th e federal land banks injected hundreds of millions of dollars into American agriculture during this moment of economic and technological transformation, spurring a dramatic expansion in rural fi nance.
Th is article examines the Federal Farm Loan Act's impact on the southern Great Plains, where federal land banks invested the majority of farm mortgages during the late 1910s. By surveying these developments within the larger history of agricultural credit, this study demonstrates the impact of the federal land banks on wartime production. Aft er 1917, the new federal land banks distributed millions of dollars in loans to wheat farmers in the Great Plains. Th e sudden availability of long-term, low-interest-rate mortgages in these historically undercapitalized lending markets funded the purchase of machinery, the consolidation of farms, and the unprecedented expansion of wheat acreage during World War I, a confl uence of events known as the Great Plow-Up. 2 Th ese government-seeded mortgages provided the capital that stimulated technological expansion on the Great Plains, spurring the consolidation and industrialization of the region's farms. At the same time, the federal government's intervention in the rural credit market sought to neutralize the historical climatic and economic vulnerabilities that had discouraged lending in the region. Ultimately, the new land bank loans facilitated the push to plant the Plains in wheat, both severing the deep roots that had held the soil on the land war but also to the rapid transformation of the Great Plains and Midwestern landscapes.
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Th e federal government's 1916 intervention in rural credits proved instrumental to increasing staple crop production, creating unprecedented agricultural surpluses, and paving the way for new regulatory initiatives in the following decades. Th e global increases in acreage and productivity that erupted during the war years eventually yielded too much wheat, especially aft er 1920 when European markets no longer demanded vast quantities of American grain. Ultimately, the new farm loan system contributed to the overproduction of staple crops that emerged as the nation's principal agricultural policy dilemma aft er World War I.
12 Th e perennial oversupply of wheat and cotton was soon reframed as a problem of surplus, which then reshaped American agricultural policy during the challenging decades of the 1920s and 1930s and into the twenty-fi rst century. Th ese broader impacts merit consideration as we evaluate the consequences of World War I, postwar economic contractions, paralyzing drought and the dust storms of the 1930s, and subsequent federal interventions in the agricultural economy.
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Seeding a System of Rural Credits
Limited access to mortgage loans had significant repercussions in rural America, and at the turn of the twentieth century American farmers suff ered from the coupled disadvantages of high interest rates and the general scarcity of rural credit. Th e farm press, agricultural economists, and farm leaders had long argued that national credit markets underserved farmers, which constrained them in their attempts to modernize. Aft er the turn of the twentieth century the limited availability market mechanisms that encouraged agricultural expansion, and have surveyed the expansion of indebtedness in twentieth-century American life, but they have failed to realize the larger ecosystemic eff ects of these changes as well as the ways in which economic programs of one era drove the market collapse of another. 7 For their part, policy historians have paid a great deal of attention to this era of governmental expansion, but without integrating a regional context that explains the social, environmental, and economic impacts of agricultural policy. 8 Th is article builds upon the literature within these fi elds by highlighting the impact of federally subsidized lending on the rural economy and illustrating how these new farm loans played an instrumental role in reshaping the landscape of production agriculture in the twentieth century.
Th e 1916 Federal Farm Loan Act off ered a mechanism for the reorganization of the rural economy that complemented other centralizing initiatives of the period, including the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, the 1914 Smith-Lever Act, and the 1916 Federal-Aid Road Act. 9 Th is rural credit legislation sought to correct inequities in the farm mortgage market and to "overcome the chaos, dysfunctions, and inequities of the unfettered market by creating new capacities for administrative control within the federal government. " 10 Ultimately, the injection of government capital facilitated the modernization of tens of thousands of farms, increased the pace of mechanization in the wheat and corn belts, and drove the capitalization of rural districts. Over a few months in 1917 the federal land banks extended almost thirty million dollars in new farm loans, injecting an infusion of credit into the rural economy that contributed materially not only to the massive gains in production during the had soared, and the passing from extensive to intensive farming necessitated more capital for farm operations. Credit was necessary in order to obtain capital. " Yet while the path to an increasingly businesslike agriculture relied on an expanded credit market, and modernizers stressed the potential for rural improvement, farm mortgages simply were not accessible to many farmers, even as reformers envisioned the social and cultural possibilities of new credit for industrializing agriculture.
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Th e nation's growing contingent of agricultural experts was quick to connect limited credit with lack of innovation, and they were foremost among the advocates for an expanded system of rural lending. Henry C. Taylor, the American founder of the discipline of agricultural economics, argued "Farm credit is essential to good agriculture" [italics in original]. Yet Taylor observed that bankers in rural communities generally only extended shortterm loans suitable for merchants and manufacturers, and these were incompatible with farmers' longer-term credit needs. Consequently, he concluded, "the bank is too rarely a farmers' credit institution. "
19 Th e paucity of long-term loans at competitive rates meant that capital for the improvements to farm buildings, livestock, machinery, and crops urged by the land grant colleges was inaccessible for many farmers. Th is disparity impeded farmers from adopting the economies of scale, modern machines, and new practices that Taylor and other experts argued were crucial for securing a resilient and productive agricultural sector.
Politics of Rural Credit
By 1912 the calls for a new approach to rural credit had reached the highest levels of govof credit in the Southern Plains materially restricted farmers' ability to invest in improvements. Whereas the Farmers' Alliance had mobilized to promote the interests of farmers during the 1880s and 1890s, organizing to provide new avenues for cooperative marketing and purchasing, many of these rural cooperatives had faltered on the heels of the political defeat of the People's Party.
14 As a result, farmers relied upon prosperous neighbors, large national banks, and life insurance companies to fund most farm mortgages, but for terms of only a few months to a few years, refl ecting the economic interests of these investors. Because credit markets generally operated on a short term, while farm managers required longerterm loans in order to buy new land or machinery, the sources of credit and the needs of the farmer were perpetually mismatched. As a result, loans to farmers were rarely suffi cient to ensure the increases in effi ciency urged by agricultural reformers. 15 Moreover, even when mortgage credit was available, it oft en came at cripplingly high rates of interest. Rural lenders rarely competed for mortgages, and national credit markets found few incentives for catering to farmers' specialized borrowing needs.
Farmers, policymakers, and even rural bankers across the nation-as well as from throughout the political spectrum-agreed that some form of systemic reform was needed in order to free up capital for rural improvements. 16 During the 1910s farm journals were replete with editorials, testimonials, and proposals focused on the necessity of improving the farmer's access to capital to invest in improvements. 17 As one early historian of rural credits described the situation: "Something was plainly wrong with agriculture. . . . Th e agricultural revolution had come, cheap land was gone, farm land commanded absolute and relatively high prices, the cost of equipment Fig. 1 . Cover of the Banker-Farmer, July 1916, highlighting the diff erence between "Farmer Smith" and "Farmer Jones. " In this cartoon the artist elaborated on the time-honored practice of comparing types of farmers, such as the frequent characterization of "Farmer Snug" and "Farmer Slack. " In this version, however, the artist off ers a pointed commentary on how farm practices aff ected each operation's credit.
Americans, and sought a solution that might allow the nation to correct for this disparity.
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Politicians in Congress recognized the need to channel long-term credit to farmers more effi ciently and cheaply, and yet they contested vigorously which mechanisms for achieving this market readjustment were most consistent with American values. Farm leaders wanted a system of rural credit organized, underwritten, and administered by the federal government. Th e agrarians in Congress proposed that federal investment in the lending marketplace would create a more equitable system, insulated from the extortionate rates of commercial lenders, which could be used to guarantee farmers low interest rates on longterm mortgages. At fi rst, President Wilson rejected this program, arguing that it clashed with the concept of a "New Freedom" that lay at the heart of his political philosophy.
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Th e gulf between the proposals dominating Congress and the political philosophy within the Wilson White House was vast. President Wilson sought to govern according to his "very deep conviction that it is unwise and unjustifi able to extend the credit of the Government to a single class of the community. " Secretary of Agriculture David Houston further clarifi ed the administration's position on rural credits in a speech to the National Grange:
I am not impressed with the wisdom and the justice of proposals that would take the money of all the people, through bonds or other devices, and lend it to the farmers or to any other class at a rate of interest lower than the economic conditions would normally require and lower than that at which other classes are securing their capital. Th is would be special legislation of a particularly odious type. ernment, and the national party platforms of the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive parties all included a call for investigating new methods for improving rural credit. 20 Refl ecting this growing consensus, in the spring of 1913 Congress authorized the appointment of the US Commission on Agricultural Credit and charged it with investigating the necessity for a system to improve rural access to credit. Th e commission's 1913 report cited jarringly high rates of interest on farm mortgages, and noted signifi cant regional variation that had a profound impact on agricultural production.
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Farmers in the Deep South, the Great Plains, and the Pacifi c Northwest operated at a particular disadvantage: rural interest rates averaged 10 percent in Montana and Wyoming; 9.6 percent in Arkansas and Florida; 9 percent in Utah and Texas; 8.9 percent in Colorado and Idaho; and 8.7 percent in Georgia, North Dakota, and Washington. Meanwhile, rates ranged between 8 and 8.6 percent in Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Oregon.
22 Th e going rate for business loans in New York City, by contrast, was 4.5 percent, and the new Federal Reserve was extending government credit to regional banks at 3 percent.
23 Th e cost to farmers was debilitating, and the Wall Street Journal estimated in 1913 that the nation's twelve million farmers, who had a gross income of $5.8 billion, were paying an estimated $510 million a year in interest on borrowed capital. 24 Farmers were oft en paying interest rates twice those of urban businessmen, and there was too little capital available for fully modernizing their operations. Even President Woodrow Wilson, the resolute defender of the principle of "special privileges to none, " acknowledged the damage inadequate credit markets did to rural Southwest, the West and the Northwest many bitter complaints have been received of excessive interest charged the farmers and others engaged in agriculture. In many instances the exactions of the money lenders make it impossible for the farmer to live comfortably and pay the banks the enormous rates demanded for the use of the money needed to produce his crops.
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Th ese loans were repeatedly rolled over and refi nanced, thus perpetually limiting the capital of aspiring farmer-businessmen. Th e clear implication was that the diff use populations and limited resources of the underdeveloped parts of the country were holding farmersand the nation-back.
Th e agrarian myth remained strong in popular culture, and farmers were celebrated in the halls of Congress and the popular press for their contributions to national prosperity, their diligence, and their thrift . Yet all too often the markets that depended on the productivity of individual farms did not align with the rural producer's own economic interests. Th e comptroller of the currency's 1916 report stressed that
[t]he farmer has been and is obliged to pay, in thousands of cases, not only twice the rate of interest usually charged in the cities to merchants and manufacturers, where the risk is just as great, but he actually has been required to pay, in many instances, three, four, fi ve, and in some instances ten times the interest rate which he ought to be charged or which is permissible under the law.
Usurious practices included a thirty-day loan of $110 to a woman homesteader at a rate of 120 percent and the thousands of loans made Instead, Wilson, Houston, and a range of fi scal conservatives championed an alternative program for improving rural credit: a voluntary, cooperative system that was wholly fi nanced by private interests, designed to serve those farmers who were best positioned to improve their operations.
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As oft en transpires in election years, however, political considerations forced Wilson to reconsider his stance on rural credits during 1916. Th e midwestern farmers who were most outspoken in their support for a system of government fi nance represented a voting bloc critical for securing Wilson's reelection. For example, Frank Odell of Omaha, Nebraska, secretary of the American Rural Credits Association, gave a well-publicized speech in January 1916 in New York City that warned: "If the Democratic Party fails to give suitable legislation on the subject it will hurt itself greatly with the farmers, especially in the Middle West. " Odell predicted that this would arise as a critical issue in the coming election season, suggesting that Democrats cultivate the farm vote in order to "off set the pro-German vote which will be solidly Republican. "
28 Th e war in Europe infl uenced the economic as well as the political scene, and provided the rationale for Wilson to revise his position on government intervention in the rural credit market.
Th roughout 1916, reminders about the urgency of reorganizing rural fi nance circulated in Congress and in the national press. In January, the comptroller of the currency reported to Congress on the oft en-usurious interest rates off ered by rural banks, exposing rates reaching as high as 20 to 1,000 percent. Th e New York Times summarized the report:
Th e most excessive interest rates are being charged by the small banks in rural communities. Especially in the South and than before and make him a more desirable customer. "
31 Quick was speaking directly to the nation's bankers through the publication of the American Bankers Association's Agricultural Commission, and assuring those who feared government-seeded competition that they would fi nd more benefi t than harm from federal intervention in the rural credit system.
During several sessions of debates over proposals to improve rural access to credit, Congress resolved to create more competition in the lending market, recognizing that high interest rates in farming areas were a pressing concern for both farmers and the nation at large. Robert J. Bulkley (d-oh), one of the original cosponsors of the Federal Farm Loan Act, wrote, "It is a problem in which the nation is even more vitally interested than the farmer himself, for availability of funds at reasonable rates is encouragement to the farmer to improve his lands and so increase his yield of foods. " Bulkley enumerated the advantages of increased production, arguing that the improvement of farm operations "interests and benefi ts us all, for it is certain to increase our national agricultural productiveness. "
32 Members of Congress recognized that agricultural production was not generally a matter of signifi cant public attention, unless a dramatic weather event such as drought or fl ooding affected commodity markets. Yet during World War I new exigencies emerged as the United States committed to sending food to Europe and developing overseas markets, and rural credits became a key element of the American war eff ort.
Rural Credit for the Wartime Farmer
Th e wartime emergency, coupled with Wilson's growing concern about securing the by a Texas bank at rates between 20 and 100 percent, even though, as the report surmised, "the funds [came] presumably from the emergency currency which the Government loaned to the bank at 3 per cent. "
30 Urban newspapers joined the chorus, publishing articles highlighting the fi nancial vulnerability of marketoriented farmers and reporting regularly on the negotiations in Washington over the terms of new rural credits legislation.
Awareness of the need to change the operation of rural credit markets extended into the banking community, and even commercial bankers acknowledged the fi nancial disadvantages that accompanied the farm mortgage market. Farm editor Herbert Quick penned an article in the Banker-Farmer suggesting "the business of the country bank is hampered and disturbed by the lack of money in the community at low rates of interest to supply the long time needs of the farmer. " Quick cited a country banker who explained the value of government-seeded loans to the larger economy: "Our farmers are in need of money in larger amounts than we can furnish and on long-time amortized loans which we can not make, in order that they may change their type of farming to a safer and more permanent agricultural basis. " Th e consequences of an infusion of capital were clear: as the farmer takes a long-term amortized loan he becomes "fi nancially emancipated" and is able to invest in his farm, expand, and diversify, thus driving the economic development of his community. Moreover, with a longterm mortgage, the farmer "is not anxious because of the mortgage which falls due in two or three years. He can plan for development. . . . He will venture into developments which he would not dare undertake while facing a rapidly maturing mortgage. . . . Th is will make the farmer's business in the bank better the proposed land banks. In eff ect, Wilson signaled his support for a rural credits law during this meeting aft er four long years of principled opposition. 33 Congress moved to reinvent the farm mortgage system in the following months, sending a compromise bill down Pennsylvania Avenue in mid-May. Two months later, on July 17, President Woodrow Wilson addressed an audience of farm state legislators and rural editors as he signed the Federal Farm Loan Act. Wilson observed, "Th e farmers, it seems to me, have occupied hitherto a singular position of disadvantage. Th ey have not had the same freedom to get credit on their real estate that others have had who were in manufacturing and commercial enterprises, farm vote, precipitated rapid progress in the negotiations over the terms of a farm fi nance law. Th e political logjam over competing versions of the rural credits legislation was broken in late January 1916 when Senator Henry Hollis (d-nh) and Representative A. F. Lever (d-sc), both long-time advocates of reforming rural credit, traveled to the White House. Th e purpose of their visit was to appeal for the president's support of federal investment in farm loan bonds. Refl ecting the press attention given to Odell's New York speech, and abrogating on his earlier insistence on "special privileges to none" in an abrupt about-face that thrilled his guests, Wilson encouraged the legislators to return to Capitol Hill and increase the amount of federal investment in houses to issue receipts against agricultural commodities to be used as collateral for loans from national banks. Th is law was craft ed to allow farmers to bank their crops until optimal prices could be realized from their produce. 35 In combination with new low-interest-rate mortgages, these programs for rural producers had a signifi cant infl uence on strengthening the hand of the farmer in national markets during the wartime boom.
Alongside the other agricultural legislation of 1916, the Federal Farm Loan Act was designed to serve the commercial farmer, and its implementation was timed auspiciously to increase the wartime production of commodity crops. Th e legislation provided a mechanism for blending government credit with private investment and distributing funds to worthy borrowers. Its structure was reminiscent of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, as the nation was divided into twelve districts, each served by a regional land bank that represented a crosssection of the nation's diverse agricultural regions. Th e US Treasury invested $750,000 in start-up capital for each district, with Congress stipulating that the remainder of the funds be subscribed by rural borrowers through their purchase of the stock of new entities termed national farm loan associations. In keeping with the terms of the legislation, President Wilson appointed a Federal Farm Loan Board to organize and oversee the national system of land banks, and within weeks it was at work coordinating the creation of a new system of rural credit in the United States.
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Th ese government-seeded loans represented both a new source of credit and a competitor to the life insurance companies and banks that had historically controlled most farm mortgages. Th e amortization provision proved one of the most revolutionary compoand while they have sustained our life, they did not in the same degree with some others share in the benefi ts of that life. "
34 Th e president recognized the transformative nature of this law for the nation's rural economy, even as he anticipated that his political future, as well as the American role in the growing international crisis, would likely rest on the votes of the farmers for whom the law had been drafted. Th at November, the farmers of the Deep South and most of the West returned their votes for Wilson, just as the new federal farm loan system was beginning to organize. Th e political exigencies of the election year and world war led to the establishment of a network of lending institutions that, in modifi ed form, continues to support commercial agriculture well into the twenty-fi rst century.
Th e Federal Farm Loan Act, entitled "An Act To provide capital for agricultural development, to create standard forms of investment based upon farm mortgage, to equalize rates of interest upon farm loans, to furnish a market for United States bonds, to create Government depositories and fi nancial agents for the United States, and for other purposes, " was part of a suite of legislation designed to benefi t farm and rural interests that the Sixty-Fourth Congress passed during the summer of 1916. Th is program to promote agricultural production, marketing, transportation, and what historian James Malin called the "Agriculture Code" also featured the Federal-Aid Road Act, which established a Bureau of Public Roads in the US Department of Agriculture with funds to assist states in building highways-the farm-to-market roads that became increasingly vital to rural communities. Later in the summer, Congress passed the Warehouse Act, codifying a part of the Farmers' Alliance subtreasury plan that permitted bonded ware-earning a low rate of return in his savings at local banks while he was liable for mortgage debts that were due at a rate at least 2 to 5 percent higher. 37 Th e 1917 Federal Farm Loan Bureau publication "Killing Off Mortgages" off ered an elaborate description of the value of amortization, along with a series of tables that clarifi ed the process of the process for farmers. Using a straightforward framing of the concept, the pamphlet spoke directly to farmers:
Th ere is a word-a long word-which used to be very unusual, but which is becoming common now, and with which every farmer ought to become familiar. Th is word is "amortization. " . . . What is "amortization" and what is there in it for a farmer? Th e word "amortization" is a cousin of a number of other words in the English language. When a wound or a disease brings death we call it "mortal. " . . . Insurance companents of the legislation: farmers were suddenly allowed to pay down the interest and principal in annual or semiannual installments, rather than regular interest payments and then the full payment of the principal at the end of the loan term. In the past, farmers would take out a loan of $1,000 for three years, paying interest only once or twice a year, with the principal balance of $1,000 due at the end of the loan term. Oft en that sum was diffi cult to reserve, and as a result, the farmer had to take a new mortgage, with new fees and commissions, and consequently reassume all the risk of the loan. By contrast, an amortized loan of $10,000 over the course of thirty-fi ve years would be paid off at a series of regular installments that composed both principal and interest, drawing down the total debt at a regular rate until it was paid in full at the end of the thirty-fi ve years. Amortization exercised a signifi cant eff ect: the farmer-businessman would no longer suff er the consequences of land banks. McAdoo stressed, "Th is is not a government bank. Th e government is advancing this capital and inaugurating this system to give the farmers an opportunity to work out their own salvation and under their own conditions. "
39 Th ese federal funds provided the start-up capital for farmers low-interest-rate, long-term, amortized credit. Th e federal land banks invested nearly thirty million dollars in new mortgages during their fi rst eight months in operation, directly stimulating the rural economy and changing the structure of agriculture in signifi cant ways. Th e timing of these loans was crucial for increasing global trade, as the Great War was wreaking havoc on the agricultural regions of Europe and grave food shortages threatened the continent, creating extensive new market opportunities for American producers.
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Managing Rural Credits
Congress designed the Federal Farm Loan Act to be administered by a governing board with expertise in farm economics. Th e appointees to the Farm Loan Board had long experience with rural fi nance: Charles E. Lobdell was a lawyer and banker from Great Bend, Kansas; George W. Norris of Philadelphia (not Nebraska senator George W. Norris) had worked as an investment banker and director of the Federal Reserve; William S. A. Smith, of Sioux City, Iowa, was a usda expert and former farmer; and Herbert Quick, editor of the farm journal Farm and Fireside, was a native Iowan living in Berkeley Springs, West Virginia.
41 Th e legislation delegated to these fi nanciers and agricultural experts the responsibility for directing the operations of the land banks, and the board convened for the fi rst time in August 1916. At this meeting-a mere nies use what are called "mortality" tables, which show the percentages of certain classes of people to die within certain periods of time. All these words are derived from the latin word "mors, " which means "death. " To "amortize" a mortgage, therefore, is to put it to death. Th e "amortization" of a mortgage means, literally, killing off the mortgage. Almost every farmer, therefore, must be interested in any system based upon the principle, fi rst, of making it possible for farmers to get into debt on an economical and even a profi table basis, and at the same time of killing the mortgage off or getting out of debt by amortization. 38 Amortization, therefore, not only strengthened the farmer's hand as he sought to weather erratic crop prices, weather, and uncertain markets, but it also provided a predictable, even, and cumulative method of paying off debt. Th is benefi t was transformative, and it reordered the agricultural landscape two decades before amortization began to be adapted regularly in home mortgages under the New Deal Home Owners Loan Corporation in 1933.
Th e proponents of the Federal Farm Loan Act aspired to equalize the lending landscape by subsidizing the creation of a system of mortgage credit in rural districts with federal start-up money and an amortized mechanism for distributing long-term loans to American farmers. Th e key ambitions behind the law were increasing productivity, expanding landownership, improving effi ciency, and bolstering economic development. Th e federal financing of the system was intended to be temporary, and Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo emphasized that federal seed money was intended to stimulate investment rather than provide permanent capital for the federal combination of government and private capital. During the fall of 1916 the Farm Loan Board mapped land bank districts (see Fig. 5 for the map of land bank locations), appointed directors for each land bank, and approved the creation of national farm loan associations, in the process facilitating the distribution of money throughout the country that began in the spring of 1917.
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Over the course of a few short months the Farm Loan Board coaxed into operation an equitable, functional, and practical system of distributing credit to farmers across the country. A central impetus for the structure of the land banks was the information gathered as the board toured the nation during the late summer and fall of 1916. Seeking "to ascertain the three weeks aft er the president signed the rural credits law-the board encountered a pile of "thousands of letters and other communications which had been accumulating in the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the White House, and various other bureaus and departments, including even the Bureau of the Census and the Congressional Library. "
42 Interest in the rural credit initiative was high, and by November the Farm Loan Board had received over 200,000 letters and telegrams requesting information about the federal land banks. 43 Th e Farm Loan Board assumed responsibility for a wide range of administrative tasks associated with craft ing a network of land banks to be funded by this unprecedented sential start-up capital of up to $750,000 per bank, and Congress intended that these funds would be supplemented and eventually replaced by subscriptions from members of the National Farm Loan Associations (nflas) who wanted to invest in and borrow from this new system of cooperative rural credit.
47 Th e individual nflas were charged with extending amortized loans for terms of between fi ve and forty years to those farmers in their community they judged to be worthy credit risks. Th ese cooperative credit associations could be organized by a group of at least ten ownerborrowers who "own and cultivate farm land. " Each participant in an nfla was required to invest at least 5 percent of his desired loan amount in the association's stock as a means of providing security for his own loans, and feelings of farmers and business men toward the new system of farm loans, " the board conducted fi ft y-three public hearings to survey the rural credit situation. 45 Rural credit markets were highly variable, and testimony before the board indicated that rates of interest ranged from 5 to 60 percent per annum, and that rates were extremely variable: in some communities at 5 percent per year, and in other communities at 5 percent per month. 46 With variation as extreme as this, the proponents of a more equitable system of rural fi nance saw great opportunities for improving the agricultural economy and strengthening rural areas as well as the nation's production capacity.
Th e organization of the farm loan system was simple by design (see Fig. 6 ). Federal investment in the land banks provided es- farm productivity and enhance the prosperity of the farmer, and thereby the general prosperity throughout the country. " In sum, the board assured the American public that the new system of rural credits would further the cause of rural reform.
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As part of its program to extend the infl uence of the new banks as widely as possible, the Farm Loan Board also began an educational campaign to raise public awareness of rural credit conditions and to promote the federal land banks and the creation of new nflas. Th e advocates for the land banks worked diligently to promote the benefi ts of investing in government-seeded loans, and the Federal Farm Loan Board produced over two million pamphlets that were distributed widely during its fi rst years of operation. "Killing Off Mortgages, " "Financing the Farmer, " "How Farmers May Form a National Farm Loan Association, " and "New Mortgages for Old" sought to educate American farmers about the opportunities available for simplifying their fi nancing provided by the Federal Farm Loan Act.
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Newspaper coverage echoed and adapted these promotional materials, and a 1917 New York Times article cited federal farm loan commissioner George W. Norris as he "rejoiced" in the increases in production that would accompany cheap credit, arguing that the new law "will enable thousands of small farmers to get loans at a low rate and on easy terms who would not have been able to borrow at all under previous conditions. " Norris predicted a reorientation of the rural economy: "Th e obtaining of long-time loans will emancipate the borrowers from their economic thralldom to the supply merchant and the local banker and permit them to do safe and diversifi ed farming. "
53 As wartime exigencies demanded the local associations were responsible for evaluating individual applications for loans.
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Loan applications were then sent to the twelve regional land banks for a second level of review of each prospective borrower's farm and mortgage security; the Farm Loan Boardappointed directors of the regional land banks were ultimately charged with determining the viability of the loans. 49 Farmers who invested in the farm loan system had the option of refinancing their high-interest-rate mortgages or investing in new labor-saving machinery, buying new land or livestock, or improving their existing infrastructure. Th e possibilities, especially in the undercapitalized sections of the country, were seemingly endless.
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Th e Farm Loan Board's investigation of rural credit conditions had reinforced the sense that there were ample opportunities to expand access to mortgage loans in many sections of the country. In late September 1916, the board released a statement explaining that most farmers were poorly served by existing credit markets. "In every State visited . . . even the industrious farmer of modest means who had only a small farm . . . was unable to get farm credit on any terms. " Th ese credit conditions refl ected not only the limited numbers of rural banks that served farming communities but also a problem of scale: small farmers and those with limited capital were squeezed the most by insuffi cient rural credit. Th e Farm Loan Board concluded that its "investigation showed a widespread and imperative necessity for the long-time amortization loans at reasonable rates of interest, (not to exceed 6 per cent.,) provided for by the Farm Loan act, " arguing that an expanded system of rural credits would "greatly stimulate agricultural development, increase farm ownerships, discourage the growing evil of farm tenantry . . . increase ers, in the northeastern capitol of Topeka and south-central Hutchinson on September 18-19, 1916 . At the Topeka hearing, E. C. Johnson, the director of agricultural extension work at the Kansas State Agricultural College, off ered an overview of both the condition of agriculture and the mortgage situation in Kansas. Johnson reported that as of 1915, Kansans owed approximately $180 million in outstanding farm mortgages. 55 Johnson cited usda fi gures reporting that the average interest rate in Kansas was 6.9 percent, including commission, yet he acknowledged that rates ranged signifi cantly within the state, with 8.8 percent typical in western counties, and between 6.3 and 7 percent more characteristic of eastern and central parts of the state. Agricultural extension director Johnson explained that these variable interest rates were attributable primarily to annual rainfall: western Kansas, characterized by the increased production of wheat and other commodity crops, the federal land banks were positioned ideally to inject much-needed capital into the rural economy and to support the improvement of American farms.
Credit on the High Plains: Federal Land Bank of Wichita
In the face of two years of extremely poor wheat yields throughout much of the nation, and the growing demand for grain in Europe, the Farm Loan Board was especially concerned with examining local lending practices in the Great Plains.
54 Keen to assess the attitudes of commercial farmers, and to promote local enthusiasm for the system, the board conducted a series of fi ft y-three hearings across forty-four states. Kansas farmers had two opportunities to interact with the farm loan commission- while another 57 percent found that rates were too high for profi table farming. Discontent was most pronounced in the western counties of Kansas, where "4 out of every 5 farmers expressed complete dissatisfaction with the rate of interest they have to pay, " pledging that they would "try anything which off ered the prospect of lower rates. " 60 Testimony before the Farm Loan Board echoed these fi gures. E. E. Frizell, a farmer and lender from near Great Bend, Kansas, described the region's need for increased credit to fund modernization: "Our farms are quite large. We need more buildings and improvements, more diversifi ed farming. " Frizell argued that the key to increased production was low-interest-rate loans for buying new grazing land to convert to crops, support mechanization, and permit the consolidation of farms. Frizell concluded, "If we had a 6 per cent rate in the western third of the state, there would be a wonderful development immediately. " Economists and farmers concurred that an increase in lending in conjunction with lower interest rates would benefi t the western farmer, alongside those bankers and other businessmen who sought to develop the country.
61
During the war years High Plains farmers were keen to increase production, and they felt an increased urgency to put more land into wheat, anticipating that continued high prices would enable them to fi nance expanded farm operations. 62 Between 1910 and 1920 investments in farm mortgages more than doubled nationwide, paving the way for the increasing capitalization of American farms. Yields and the total acreage in production had been increasing steadily in response to advancements in machinery and biological innovations. 63 As a result, conditions were prime for a mortgage rush under the new land banks, and following the passage of the Federal Farm Loan cycles of decent precipitation and high production followed by years with insuffi cient rain, represented an unstable investment.
56
In Kansas and elsewhere, local credit markets refl ected both ecological and market vulnerability. Th e inconsistency of yields in western Kansas (see Fig. 8 ), as well as the rest of the High Plains, meant that returns on investment were erratic and cyclical, and consequently the life insurance companies and commercial banks that had long funded most of the nation's institutional mortgages had bypassed the region almost entirely. 57 In this case, climatic variability, compounded by undercapitalization and the limited number of urban centers, meant that the region was starved for credit. In 1915 University of Kansas economist George Putnam chronicled the challenges of farm finance in western Kansas, explaining:
Land values are speculative chiefl y because of the uncertainty of the wheat crop. In several counties fully 90 per cent of the total improved farm acreage is devoted to the production of wheat. When good years follow in succession, settlers are attracted in large numbers and land sells at a high fi gure. When drought follows drought, land values decline and there is a material diminution in the number of operated farms . . . and the uncertainty arising from the possibility of a crop failure is refl ected in the current rate of interest.
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Even when credit could be procured from local lenders, interest rates were high, and Putnam explained, "Th e highest rate reported by western bankers is 10 per cent, " but once additional charges were calculated into the total, "the actual rate is frequently usurious. " 59 Statewide, Putnam reported that 35 percent of Kansas farmers were satisfi ed with interest rates, Loan Board that lenders had long refused to extend any mortgages in the region. L. L. Taylor explained, "I have probably 100 applications out there wanting money, and [the insurance companies] just write back that they are not placing any money in Morton, Grant, Stevens-. " 67 Some eastern bankers surmised that national mortgage lenders simply would not extend loans west of the 99th or 100th meridian. 68 Into this semiarid, credit-starved landscape stepped the new federal land banks, with their start-up capital from the US Treasury, committed local investors, and diversifi ed agricultural interests.
Boom Times: Yields Rise as Interest Rates Decline
Th e cumulative impact of the federal land bank loans on the transformation of the nation's lending market was dramatic: the Federal Farm Loan Act created a new pool of money available with attractive terms and low rates of interest. As a consequence, the land banks altered both the terms of loans and precipitated signifi cant declines in interest rates for American farmers, especially those on the High Plains. In September 1916, only three months aft er the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act, Kansas lenders and borrowers were already arguing that the impact of the Federal Farm Loan Act had begun even before the fi rst nflas were formed. 69 John E. Wagner (a self-described banker-philanthropist) from Larned, Kansas, testifi ed that bankers had dropped interest rates in anticipation of the passage of the Farm Loan Act: "It certainly has had a fi ne eff ect. If this Farm Loan Board never made a loan the eff ect would be the same to the farmer, that it has forced down the rate of interest that he is compelled to pay. It is Act, Kansas led the nation in the demand for government-seeded credit. Th e Federal Land Bank of Wichita was the fi rst of the twelve regional banks to open its doors, and the Farm Loan Board granted the inaugural national farm loan association charter to the Pawnee County Farm Loan Association of Kansas. During 1917 Kansans received more money from the federal land banks than any other Americans, profi ting from a rate of closed loans more than twice that of North Dakota, the second highest-funded state.
64 Th e resulting infl ux of capital facilitated the plow-up of millions of additional acres of shortgrass prairie in both the Northern and Southern Plains during the following years, as well as a boom in wheat production that would have unanticipated economic and ecological consequences in the region for decades to come. Th e results were profound: almost simultaneously, the decline in interest rates spurred by the creation of the federal land banks led to dramatic reductions in the cost of improving operations, and consequently, to improvements in efficiency long promoted by agricultural economists and farm managers. 65 National newspapers were quick to predict the success of the Farm Loan Act. Th e New York Times argued, "It will work a great transformation in the agricultural conditions of the whole country. Neglected and undeveloped areas will be developed. " Reporters reiterated the assertion that a diverse constituency would benefi t from this fi nancing: "large holdings will be broken up, the number of homes will be multiplied, and the independence and thrift of the farmer will be advanced. " 66 Many Kansans believed that economic impacts would prove even more pronounced on the High Plains, and one real estate broker from Dodge City testifi ed before the Farm the land banks' fi xed interest rate of 5 percent forced local lenders to adopt more competitive rates, freeing up millions of dollars in interest payments for other purposes. As a result, these new government-seeded institutions reconfi gured the farm mortgage business.
Th e nation's wheat producers realized the most dramatic eff ects of this infl ux of government money, and land banks in Wichita, St. Paul, and Spokane led the nation in loans. 75 Th e fi gures for the Wichita bank highlight the importance of mortgage credit to the conversion of the Southern Plains from shortgrass prairie to wheat (Kansas cultivation of fi eld crops rose 9.4 percent between 1916 and 1919 alone). 76 Between March and November 1917 Kansas led the nation in land bank loans by a considerable margin, with more than $3.59 million in farm loans, twice as much credit as the next-highest states, North Dakota, Washington, Oklahoma, and Montana, which received between $1.8 and $1.6 million in loans. 77 Each new mortgage in these wheat-producing districts was invested in new land, machinery, and improvements, or used to pay off existing high-interest-rate loans. Almost overnight, these wheat farmers were able to realize their ambitions to fund increased acreages, new machines, or other effi ciencies.
Long-term mortgages from the new federal land banks played a signifi cant role in the exmaking farm loans cheaper and will save millions because the very investor who is holding these loans today must either go out of business or meet the government rate. " 70 A March 1917 article in Outlook reported that mortgage applications had declined in areas with historically high interest rates, and that "impending competition from the Government banks has made it necessary for [lenders] to quote the farmer lower rates of interest. "
71 In 1918 the second Annual Report of the Federal Farm Loan Board summarized the consensus: the new system of government-seeded mortgage credits provided an "indirect benefi t to every applicant for a farm loan through private agencies. " "A distinct reduction, not only in the rate of interest on such loans, but also in the accompanying charges and commissions, was manifest almost immediately aft er the passage of the act. "
72 By adding more competition and fl exibility to the nation's mortgage markets, the federal land banks allowed farmer-businessmen to operate on a more equal basis with their urban counterparts.
Th e broader impacts of the new farm loan system stretched far beyond the nearly thirty million dollars in federal land bank loans closed between March 27 and November 30, 1917. During these eight months, 1839 nflas funded amortized loans to over 14,000 American farmers at a fi xed rate of interest. 73 Th is fi rst infl ux of loans went to the nation's owneroperated, market-oriented farmers, those who were up to date with the latest developments in agricultural improvement. Even more signifi cantly, these mortgages went to farmers in the historically underfi nanced parts of the country, "respond[ing] to the demand for credit in areas hitherto not emphasized by the leading mortgage agencies. " 74 Nationwide
Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo reinforced this message in a circular to the new federal land banks, stressing the "importance of cultivating every available piece of land" in order to meet the exigencies of war. Increasing production dramatically, in order to generate surpluses suffi cient to meet the nation's domestic needs and the demands of military forces stationed overseas, was seen as an imperative by the US government and by many American citizens. During the Great War, patriotic duty and economic incentives came together, and soaring wheat prices provided further inducements for increased production, especially once the Food Administration set a guaranteed price of two dollars a bushel for the 1918 crop year.
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Th e wartime boom in agriculture refl ected a new level of organization on the part of the nation's farmers, governments, and citizens. Until World War I, the federal government had hesitated to intervene in agricultural markets, but this too changed during the war years. Beginning in 1917 the Food Administration under Herbert Hoover engaged in a widespread campaign to increase agricultural production and conserve food supplies. Farmers put in their largest crops ever, increasing dramatically the nation's production of staple crops. Th e resulting growth in crop production was remarkable: in 1917 the acreage planted in cereals, potatoes, tobacco, and cotton reached a national record of 283 million acres, up 8 percent from 1916 and a 12 percent increase over 1915.
83 Th e effi ciencies that came from increasing government support for agriculture, the assurances of stable prices for wheat even in the face of dramatically increased production, and the encouragement of surpluses reshaped the expectations of American farmers and consumers, and signaled a new era in American agriculture. pansion of US wheat production aft er 1917. In this era of technological and mechanical innovations, new capital investments were of the upmost importance to wheat farmers, and the timing of this new pool of capital was opportune. In early 1917 the national government's concerns about food production were reaching a crescendo, and the US Food Administration began an urgent wartime campaign for increased grain production; simultaneously, Plains wheat farmers were seeking to regroup aft er a dismal harvest. 78 Meanwhile, war-torn nations in Europe were no longer able to feed their population: the Central Powers had cut off Russian wheat supplies, French and Belgian farms had been ravaged by trenches and battlefi elds, and millions of young men had become soldiers. 79 Into this crisis stepped the US government, which called for American farmers to increase their production of staple crops, famously captured in Pare Lorenz's Th e Plow that Broke the Plains as "Plant more wheat . . . Wheat will win the war!"
80 Th e interventionist policies of the Wilson administration played out dramatically in the agricultural sector.
President Wilson stressed the importance of increased agricultural production, and he spoke directly to farmers in an April address to the nation:
Th e supreme need of our own nation and of the nations with which we are [cooperating] is an abundance of supplies, and especially of food-stuff s. Th e importance of an adequate food supply, especially for the present year, is superlative. Without abundant food . . . the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked will break down and fail. . . . Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure, rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations. 1917, Plains farmers were able to deploy new forms of credit and mechanize, consolidate, and plow up new land-spurring a dramatic increase in production and profi ts. 88 Th e day-to-day challenges of wartime production played out beginning in early 1917, as the federal land banks were beginning to organize. Young men, a crucial source of labor for American farms, were draft ed into service, and rising grain prices made fueling horsepower less economical. As a result, the nation's larger-scale farmers found new incentives to mechanize, and the increased availability of long-term credit drove signifi cant increases in tractor purchases. 89 In 1910 there had been 4,000 tractors on American farms, and farmers purchased roughly 4,000 in each of the following years. 90 Th e war years saw a dramatic surge in tractor sales, with 28,000 sold in 1915, 50,000 in 1917, 96,000 in 1918, and 136,000 in 1919; in total there were 246,000 tractors on American farms by 1920. Th ese tractors provided a means of expanding production onto the ever-larger fi elds of the Great Plains, and demanded an increased investment in farm machinery with profound implication on rural fi nance during the coming decades. Th e mechanical innovations of the 1910s and the wartime labor and feed shortage combined to drive the increase in numbers of tractors on the nation's commercial farms. 91 Tractor purchases facilitated the increased cultivation of large acreages and precipitated a greater dedication to wheat production on the dryland farms of the Great Plains. Th e expansion of tractor power on to the Plains was further propelled by the launch of the low-priced, lightweight Fordson model in 1917, new competition that spurred tractor manufacturers to race to drop prices in order to claim increased market share. 92 Whereas the average cost of Initially, the weather in the wheat belts did not cooperate with the nation's geopolitical interests, and dry conditions diminished yields in both 1916 and 1917 . Th e 1917 Yearbook of Agriculture reported that the wheat crop of 1916 was "strikingly small" and predicted that "on account of adverse weather conditions, " wheat yields in 1917 would also be low. 84 Th roughout the Southern Plains, where winter wheat prevailed, these dry seasons were nearly catastrophic, with winterkill scorching crops, leading to plummeting yields and creating increasingly anxious farmers. 85 Th e correspondence between the Farm Loan Board in Washington and the Federal Land Bank of Wichita referred repeatedly to damaging wind and dust storms. Th e president of the Wichita bank, Dan Callahan, wrote in April 1917 that "the wheat is blown out" in western Kansas and eastern Colorado, and that he had never seen "a worse Spring in this section of the state. "
86 Callahan responded to a followup inquiry a few days later: "To be honest about it, [I] have delayed a few days expecting we would get some rain. We are having more wind and dirt than we have had for 25 years. I have been out a few days myself this week, and the facts, between you and I, are that it is so bad it is almost impossible for men to work. " 87 Drought and dust storms were regular visitors to the Great Plains, and dry conditions were no secret by the late 1910s. What was notable about this period in the Plains-a function of the strongest La Niña event of the fi rst half of the twentieth century-was that it came at a crucial moment, as the nation was pushing to increase its wheat production, and was strengthened by an infl ux of capital that permitted farmers to ride out weather conditions with a new source of credit. When weather conditions improved in the second half of in total cultivated acreage, the acreage in fi eld crops in 1918 totaled 22,588,000 acres, almost half the state's land area. 97 Further augmenting this surge in cropland, Kansas farmers secured an additional $3.59 million in new land bank loans for new land and machinery, thus facilitating the increased production that proved critical for supplying food to civilians and soldiers in the United States and abroad. By 1920 the Kansas wheat crop reached 147 million bushels, up from a twenty-year average of eighty-six million bushels; this nearly twofold increase revolutionized the state's economy.
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Although the Kansas case provides the most dramatic demonstration of the impact of increased mortgage credit and higher crop prices on American agriculture, the pattern in this state played out to varying degrees across the rest of the Great Plains and the South.
Reshaping the Mortgage Market
Th e wartime boom in agriculture precipitated farm indebtedness and spurred additional investments in farm mortgages by land banks and other lenders. Increased mechanization, new technologies, and the urge to maximize profi t from high wartime prices all drove farmers to borrow more money to improve their operations. Moreover, between 1910 and 1920, rising land prices and frequent land transfers more than doubled the nation's gross farm mortgage indebtedness from $3.3 billion to $7.9 billion.
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American farmers borrowed money for land and machinery from neighbors, national life insurance companies, and state and national banks, as well as the new nflas. As of January 1919, private lenders, identifi ed as "individuals and others" by the usda, still represented the vast majority of mortgage a new tractor in 1910 had been $1,500, a 1918 Fordson was priced at $750. Consequently, the combination of reduced costs, rising profi ts, improved technology, and increased mortgage availability led to a fi vefold increase in the number of tractors in Kansas between 1918 and 1922, from 5,000 to 25,000 machines.
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Th e fi nancial implications of farmers' investments in new farm machinery proved considerable: new implement loans necessitated adjustments to fi nancial calculations and oft en required increases in production in order to make regular payments. Machinery later became a liability when crop prices plummeted aft er the war, and during the 1920s the need to make payments on the interest due on implement loans contributed not only to the continued plow-up of shortgrass prairie but also to the surge in farm foreclosures. 94 Th e resulting surpluses, especially once the price fl oor was removed at the end of the war, led to dramatic declines in commodity crop prices and the accumulation of vast quantities of unwanted grain in the Great Plains.
In the immediate term, however, surplus production in the Plains was hailed as an unequivocal success, and in late winter 1918, President Wilson delivered an address to farmers that celebrated the increases in production since the spring of 1917, when "planting exceeded by 12,000,000 acres the largest planting of any previous year, and the yields from the crops were record-breaking yields. " tribute approximately three-quarters of the bulk of the country's staple food products. "
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Many analysts have argued that given the vast sums loaned by other types of institutional lenders, the federal land banks exercised a negligible impact on farm fi nance during the 1910s and 1920s. And in terms of dollars invested alone, the twelve federal land banks' mortgages totaling $156,210,000 pale in comparison with the nearly seven billion dollars in private and commercial loans made during the same period.
102 Yet the common interpretation that during the war years the land banks were, as L. J. Norton argued, "unimportant, having just been organized and in the process of fi nding a modest place for themselves, " unravels when these loans are evaluated within the holders, and these investors held more than $4,924,364,000 in additional farm-mortgage debt. By comparison, commercial banks were the largest institutional holders of farm mortgage debt in the United States, with $1,030,240,000 in farm loans, while insurance companies held an additional $1,018,163,000 in mortgages. spread reductions in rates freed up additional capital for the nation's farmers during the critical production years of . By 1920 , the usurious lending patterns described only a few years before were largely a relic of the past, and while average interest rates still remained higher in the South and on the High Plains, they had declined considerably (see Fig. 10 ).
Th e immediate impacts of long-term amortized loans at a low rate of interest were especially evident in those areas that formerly suff ered from inadequate access to credit. A 1935 study of farm mortgages correlated land bank loans with the average interest rate by state, demonstrating that in 1920 there was a conclusive "concentration of loans by the fedlarger context of interest rates, amortization, and lending patterns in the wartime mortgage market.
103 Over the fi rst twenty months following the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act, the new government-seeded banks made a comparatively modest foray into the mortgage market, but at the same time, through their presence as a competitor in the mortgage marketplace these land banks exercised a major infl uence on interest rates nationwide, and especially on the rates and terms off ered to borrowers by commercial banks and insurance companies. 104 Competition from longterm, amortized, government-seeded loans at 5 percent interest forced commercial lenders to adjust their lending patterns, and the wide- by Congressman Joseph W. Fordney (r-mi) to derail the farm loan system. Fordney had argued: "Th e federal farm loan act is a farce. Th e loans made by the federal land banks are such loans generally as prudent bankers and money lenders will not make. " To this accusation editors replied: "the loan system is almost universally satisfactory, except to the mortgage bankers. We would suggest that the Republicans better not monkey with the farm loan act unless they want to get in bad with the farmers. "
108 In August, the Prairie Farmer continued its campaign against the opponents of the land banks in an article chronicling how the Farm Mortgage Bankers' Association was "out gunning" for the land banks. Th is article dissected several critiques of these credit agencies' administration, arguing that attacks on the federal mortgage system were unfounded and based on "falsehood and misrepresentation. "
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In spite of the political turmoil featured in the Prairie Farmer and the halls of Congress, the consensus across the nation was that the federal mortgage system benefi ted borrowers. It empowered them to seek new sources of credit, even as it challenged commercial lenders to compete with the federal land banks by encouraging existing mortgagees to refi nance their high-interest-rate, short-term loans. An estimated 60 percent of land bank borrowers used their loans used to pay off existing mortgages, while the remainder used their loans to improve their operations by purchasing land, erecting new buildings, and buying implements, equipment, and livestock.
110 Th e nflas helped farmers modernize, and operate as their own bankers, while their new longterm loans and lower interest rates granted the fl exibility to invest in the labor-saving devices and economies of scale that were believed to represent the salvation of modern agriculeral land banks in the South and West, " areas that had suff ered the most from undercapitalization and high interest rates. Economist Arthur Murray divided the nation into two parts, those states with medium average rates below 6.3 percent and those with rates above the average, and Kansas ranked seventeenth in the enumeration of the twenty-four "low interest" states; interestingly, the wheat states of Kansas and Nebraska were the only trans-Missouri states on Murray's "low interest" list.
105 Murray's larger conclusions are consistent with other evidence, and he observed, "Th e federal land banks in the early years obtained the largest percentage of the loan business in the high-risk areas. " 106 Whereas the federal land banks overall held only 3.8 percent of the total farm mortgage debt in 1920, the proportion was 6.1 percent in Murray's twenty-four "high interest" states (not including Kansas and Nebraska), as opposed to 2.4 percent in the "low-interest" states. 107 Th ese fi gures testify to the signifi cance of land bank loans in those historically undercapitalized regions of the country that provided critical food and fi ber during the war years.
Not all commentary on the federal land banks was positive, however, and between 1918 and 1920 there were a number of political and legal assaults on the Federal Farm Loan Act. While many lenders in the Great Plains had voiced early and consistent support for the legislation, local and regional bankers were not uniformly supportive of the developments in the farm loan fi eld. During 1918 and 1919 midwestern bankers led a series of eff orts to delegitimize the federal land banks and the new system of government-seeded credit. In April 1919 the Prairie Farmer published "Gas Attack on Loan System, " an article freighted with meaning, reporting on an initiative led farmers and policymakers since 1933 have been governed largely by a federal agricultural policy dedicated to managing regular surpluses of commodity crops.
111 Th e environmental and agroecological impacts of these changes were sizeable, as many historians have recognized, and yet their political and economic impacts have been neglected for too long.
As the data indicate, lending by the federal land banks represented a relatively small proportion of new farm mortgage debt during the war years, and yet the provisions of the Federal Farm Loan Act exercised an outsized infl uence on the rural economy.
112 First, these government-seeded loans represented both a new source of credit and a competitor to the local investors, life insurance companies, and banks that had historically controlled most farm mortgages. As a result, between 1916 and 1920 the average interest rate for farm mortgages came down from between 8 and 10 percent to between 5.1 and 7.8 percent, a clear demonstration of the infl uence of federally funded farm loans at 5 percent interest.
113
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the land banks' innovations in amortization provided an unprecedented and decades-long cushion for farm investments almost two decades before a parallel federal intervention reshaped the home mortgage marketplace. 114 Th ird, the greatest impacts of the farm loan system were felt in farming communities that had long been neglected by institutional lenders-those on the margins of production agriculture, including the High Plains and the Deep South. Th ese undercapitalized regions proved instrumental to the war eff ort, even if their lack of native capital also signaled their ecological vulnerability. Th e availability of new credit spurred a rapid increase in the production of valuable commodity crops, which ture. Th e increased production temporarily bolstered regional fortunes, but it also led the wheat belt into an unprecedented cycle of surplus production, and eventually, exacerbated by the vast acreages that had been put into production, foreclosures, bankruptcies, and in the 1930s, drought and dust storms.
Conclusion
Acknowledging the importance of these new wartime sources of credit for owneroperated farms allows scholars to confront a series of new and compelling questions about the role of government-seeded credit in the transformation-and industrialization-of agriculture. During the late 1910s the terms of the Federal Farm Loan Act created a network of new fi nancial institutions that permitted farmers to develop an expanded and increasingly effi cient agricultural landscape that drove down commodity prices and produced annual crop surpluses. During World War I, however, it was not only the notorious "suitcase farmer" who benefi ted from this new system but also those ambitious but undercapitalized farmer-businessmen who bought new land, new machines, and consolidated farms using new forms of low-priced credit. Th e presence of a new force in rural fi nancethe US government-revolutionized the rural economy and led to the sustained manipulation of the formerly laissez-faire farm mortgage market through federal credit. Th ese consequences contributed to the reconfi guration of the Great Plains in ways that would prove defi nitive during the coming decades. During the 1920s and beyond, the continuing high levels of production and a new pattern of surpluses reshaped the landscape American agricultural production. As a consequence, meant that the nation could export increasing quantities of grain and produce to Europe. Th e cumulative impacts of the new federal land banks far exceeded the sum of their loans during the fi rst few years of operation because competition from government-seeded mortgages drove the reorientation of rural lending and ultimately contributed to the reorganization of American agriculture during World War I and beyond.
Notes
Th e story of the economic, policy, and environmental impacts of the Federal Farm Loan Act highlights some of the unintended consequences of manipulating fi nancial institutions: what originated as an attempt to off er expanded access to the national markets for credit proved essential for the improvement of individual farms, yet eventually contributed to a signifi cant distortion of the agricultural marketplace. Th e surpluses that resulted from the expansion in acreage and the increases in productivity during World War I carried profound environmental, as well as economic and political, consequences for American markets. Th is government intervention in rural fi nance proved as infl uential as capitalism itself in fueling the development of agriculture in the Southern Plains, and contributed materially to the Great Plow-Up that transformed wheat production in western Kansas, Oklahoma, and eastern Colorado. Yet in spite of the unanticipated results from this government program, the federal land banks proved pivotal in increasing access to low-priced credit, and thereby corrected for a long-time imbalance that had held back entrepreneurs and working people in rural America. Th e creation of a government-seeded system of credit sped the emergence of a new landscape of production in the wheat belt, with profound implications for the future of agriculture in the United States. Amount and Distribution, 1909 -1919 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1921 25. Wilson echoed William Jennings Bryan in 1913 when he stressed the importance of the farmer to the national economy, observing, "It is from the quiet interspaces of the open valleys and the free hillsides that we draw the sources of life and prosperity, from the farms and the ranch, from the forest and the mine. Without these every street would be silent, every offi ce deserted, every factory fallen to disre-14. Lawrence Goodwyn, Th e Populist Moment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Miner, Next Year Country, [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] 15. Most insurance company loans to agriculture, for example, were extended for a period of fi ve to seven years on a nonamortized basis-in other words, borrowers paid regular interest payments, but the principal (the amount borrowed) was due in one lump payment at the end of the term of the loan. As agricultural economist Taylor emphasized, insurance companies were well suited to investing in farm mortgages: "agents are usually men who know the local situation thoroughly. . . . Th e insurance company is in no hurry for its money, hence it prefers long-time loans. " Henry C. Taylor 17. Of the hundreds of editorials, letters to the editor, and reports on the credit system, a sampling suffi ces to survey the political and economic landscape. Editorial, "Rural Credits and the Banker, " BankerFarmer 3 (May 1916): 8; Editorial Comment, "Th e Problem of Credit, " Successful Farming 15 (July 1914): 1; "Credit for Farmers, " Wallace's Farmer, September 5, 1914 September 5, , 1203 18 [32] [33] . See also the testimony of John L. Powell, Wichita, to the Farm annum amounted to 15 percent of the principal sum borrowed, an amount that was deducted when the loan was eff ected, which meant that the borrower received only 85 percent of the principal and yet paid at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the full amount of the loan, in addition to paying for abstract, legal, and recording fees.
47. Th e secretary of the treasury emphasized, "Th is is not a government bank. Th e government is advancing this capital and inaugurating this system to give the farmers an opportunity to work out their own salvation and under their own conditions. " Statement of Secretary of the Treasury William G.
